k***@yahoo.com
2006-01-27 10:05:40 UTC
DPP v SMITH
(Filed: 26/01/2006)
Divisional Court
Sir Igor Judge (President QB), Cresswell J
January 17, 2006
Actual bodily harm - Actus reus - Assault - Hair - Element of the
offence - Cutting of hair without consent - Offences Against the Person
Act 1861
FACTS
The DPP appealed by way of case stated against a decision of a
magistrates' court that the respondent (R) had no case to answer to a
charge of assault causing actual bodily harm contrary to the Offences
against the Person Act 1861. Information had been laid against R that
he had caused actual bodily harm to his former partner (X), by cutting
her hair. The magistrates' court acceded to an application by R of no
case to answer on the basis that, whilst the evidence before the court
indicated that X had been assaulted by R, as X had suffered no
bruising, bleeding, scratching of her skin or psychological harm, an
important element of the alleged offence was missing. R contended that,
although hair was subcutaneous, on the scalp it was dead tissue
incapable of being part of the body.
ISSUE
Whether the magistrates' court had been wrong in law to hold that the
cutting of X's hair did not amount to assault occasioning actual bodily
harm.
HELD (Appeal allowed)
Actual bodily harm meant what it said, therefore, it was necessary to
look at the definitions of those words as used in ordinary language.
Harm was not limited to injury and included hurt or damage. "Actual"
meant not being so trivial as to be without significance. "Bodily"
meant concerned with the body. The authorities indicated that actual
bodily harm applied to all parts of the body and that pain was not a
necessary element of the offence. Whether it was alive beneath the
surface of the skin, or dead tissue, hair was part of the human body
and was intrinsic to every human. Even if hair on the scalp was
medically no more than dead tissue, whilst attached to the scalp it
fell within the meaning of bodily in the term "actual bodily harm".
Cutting hair, like putting paint on, or other injury to hair, was
capable of being assault causing actual bodily harm. R v Donovan (1934)
2 KB 498, R v Chan-Fook (1994) 1 WLR 689, R v Stephen Cook (unreported,
28 July 1994, Court of Appeal) and T v DPP (2003) EWHC 266 considered.
Timothy Green (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for the
appellant. George Fairburn (instructed by Timothy Gascoyne, Tipton) for
the respondent.
http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/lawreports/lawreps02.xml
(Filed: 26/01/2006)
Divisional Court
Sir Igor Judge (President QB), Cresswell J
January 17, 2006
Actual bodily harm - Actus reus - Assault - Hair - Element of the
offence - Cutting of hair without consent - Offences Against the Person
Act 1861
FACTS
The DPP appealed by way of case stated against a decision of a
magistrates' court that the respondent (R) had no case to answer to a
charge of assault causing actual bodily harm contrary to the Offences
against the Person Act 1861. Information had been laid against R that
he had caused actual bodily harm to his former partner (X), by cutting
her hair. The magistrates' court acceded to an application by R of no
case to answer on the basis that, whilst the evidence before the court
indicated that X had been assaulted by R, as X had suffered no
bruising, bleeding, scratching of her skin or psychological harm, an
important element of the alleged offence was missing. R contended that,
although hair was subcutaneous, on the scalp it was dead tissue
incapable of being part of the body.
ISSUE
Whether the magistrates' court had been wrong in law to hold that the
cutting of X's hair did not amount to assault occasioning actual bodily
harm.
HELD (Appeal allowed)
Actual bodily harm meant what it said, therefore, it was necessary to
look at the definitions of those words as used in ordinary language.
Harm was not limited to injury and included hurt or damage. "Actual"
meant not being so trivial as to be without significance. "Bodily"
meant concerned with the body. The authorities indicated that actual
bodily harm applied to all parts of the body and that pain was not a
necessary element of the offence. Whether it was alive beneath the
surface of the skin, or dead tissue, hair was part of the human body
and was intrinsic to every human. Even if hair on the scalp was
medically no more than dead tissue, whilst attached to the scalp it
fell within the meaning of bodily in the term "actual bodily harm".
Cutting hair, like putting paint on, or other injury to hair, was
capable of being assault causing actual bodily harm. R v Donovan (1934)
2 KB 498, R v Chan-Fook (1994) 1 WLR 689, R v Stephen Cook (unreported,
28 July 1994, Court of Appeal) and T v DPP (2003) EWHC 266 considered.
Timothy Green (instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service) for the
appellant. George Fairburn (instructed by Timothy Gascoyne, Tipton) for
the respondent.
http://news.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/lawreports/lawreps02.xml